Habeas, Informational Asymmetries, and the War on Terror by Connolly, Jon & Falkoff, Mark D.
FALKOFF AND CONNOLLY_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/7/2011 1:39 PM 
 
1361 
Habeas, Informational Asymmetries, and the  
War on Terror 
Jon Connolly∗ 
Marc D. Falkoff ∗∗ 
“You can’t go out, you’re arrested.” 
“So it seems,” said K.  “But what for?” he added. 
“We are not authorized to tell you that.  Go to your room and wait 
there.  Proceedings have been instituted against you, and you will  
be informed of everything in due course. I am exceeding my in-






In Franz Kafka’s The Trial, the protagonist, Josef K., discovers 
one morning while waiting for his breakfast that he has been ar-
rested.  The mysterious men in black who come to Josef K.’s room in-
form him that he is under arrest, but refuse to tell him what crime he 
is accused of, what evidence there is against him, or even by what au-
thority they are arresting him.  Over the course of the novel he moves 
through a series of cryptic and often bizarre encounters with various 
representatives of the law and legal system, all of whom refuse to ex-
plain themselves to him.
2
  This atmosphere of confusion, frustration, 
and helplessness resonates so powerfully that in everyday speech we 
now use the adjective “Kafkaesque” to describe a situation in which 
an individual is trapped in a seemingly capricious system that refuses 
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 1 FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL 3 (Willa Muir & Edwin Muir trans., Schocken Books 
1992) (1925).  
 2 See generally id.  
 3 See, e.g., FREDERICK ROBERT KARL, FRANZ KAFKA, REPRESENTATIVE MAN 758 
(1991); NEIL KING & SARAH KING, DICTIONARY OF LITERATURE IN ENGLISH 85 (2002). 
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The central feature of the Kafkaesque scenario—being trapped 
by an opaque authority that reveals no information—is an exagge-
rated version of a situation familiar to many criminal defense practi-
tioners, in which the information asymmetry between the govern-
ment and the defendant is large, and defense counsel frequently 
spends considerable effort trying to extract information about the 
charges and the evidence from the government.
4
  In fact, a consider-
able amount of modern criminal procedure is concerned with regu-
lating and mandating the systematic disclosure of important informa-
tion to the defendant so that he can contest the efforts to deprive 
him of his liberty.
5
 
The government frequently detains people outside of the crimi-
nal law system, however.  In those scenarios the rules of criminal pro-
cedure do not apply,
6
 but the informational asymmetries between 
captor and captive remain.  In non-criminal contexts, such as immi-
gration or national security detention, the availability of the writ of 
habeas corpus has become an increasingly important tool for contest-
 
 4 See, e.g., Alafair S. Burke, Revisiting Prosecutorial Disclosure, 84 IND. L.J. 481, 484–
88 (2009) (offering critical review of prosecutors’ disclosure obligations); Mary 
Prosser, Reforming Criminal Discovery: Why Old Objections Must Yield to New Realities, 
2006 WIS. L. REV. 541, 541–45 (2006) (recounting story of likely innocent robbery 
suspect who was convicted because failures of timely disclosure made alibi verifica-
tion impossible); H. Lee Sarokin & William E. Zuckerman, Presumed Innocent—
Restrictions on Criminal Discovery in Federal Court Belie This Presumption, 43 RUTGERS L. 
REV. 1089, 1092–93 (1991) (criticizing weak criminal discovery and likening defen-
dants’ situation to the one described in Kafka’s work); see also Barry Nakell, The Effect 
of Due Process on Criminal Defense Discovery, 62 KY. L.J. 58, 58–59 (1973) (reviewing Su-
preme Court decisions and arguing that Due Process requires expanded discovery in 
criminal cases). 
 5 For example, absent certain circumstances, before a person can be arrested a 
court must issue an arrest warrant that requires a showing of probable cause.  FED. R. 
CRIM. P. 4.  Once a defendant is arrested, the government must satisfy its probable 
cause burden within a specific length of time, FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1, 18 U.S.C. § 3060 
(2006), and the government must return an indictment within a specified amount of 
time, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (2006).  Moreover, the government must make timely disclo-
sure of exculpatory material to the defense.  See, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 
87–88 (1963) (“[T]he suppression . . . of evidence favorable to an accused . . . vi-
olates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, 
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution”); see also Giglio v. Unit-
ed States, 405 U.S. 150, 154–55 (1972) (requiring prosecutors to disclose to the de-
fense information about any deals they may have made with witnesses against the de-
fendant).  
 6 See. e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 1 (“These rules govern the procedure in all criminal 
proceedings in the United States district courts, the United States courts of appeals, 
and the Supreme Court of the United States.”). 
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ing an individual’s detention and for compelling the government to 
articulate the basis for the detention.
7
 
Habeas is primarily familiar to most American lawyers and legal 
scholars as a mechanism of collateral review of the constitutional suf-
ficiency of a criminal conviction, and over the years an elaborate set 
of rules and doctrines has evolved around this very common prac-
tice.
8
  But there is an older and more traditional deployment of the 
writ available, which can be used to challenge executive detention in 
the non-criminal context.
9
  It is to this more general form of habeas 
that this Article is directed. 
Habeas corpus is often viewed as intended to protect an individ-
ual’s rights against arbitrary deprivations of liberty.
10
  It has also fre-
quently been understood in structural terms—for example, as an im-
portant element of separation of powers doctrine, as a judicial check 
on the executive and legislative branches,
11
 or as an important means 




 7 See, e.g., Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law and Federal Court Jurisdiction 
Through the Lens of Habeas Corpus, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 459, 463–68 (2005) (reviewing 
the importance of habeas litigation in immigration law); Gerald L. Neuman, Habeas 
Corpus, Executive Detention, and the Removal of Aliens, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 961, 1004–20 
(1998) (surveying the historical importance of habeas corpus for immigration law); 
Jonathan L. Hafetz, Note, The Untold Story of Noncriminal Habeas Corpus and the 1996 
Immigration Acts, 107 YALE L.J. 2509, 2524 (1998).  
 8 See generally 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254, 2255 (2006); CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., RL 33391, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS: A BRIEF LEGAL OVERVIEW (2006). 
 9 See 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006); Motomura, supra note 7, at 463–68. 
 10 See, e.g., Larry W. Yackle, Explaining Habeas Corpus, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 991, 998–
99 & n.23 (1985)(citing PAUL BATOR ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS 
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1477 (2d ed. 1973))(characterizing the liberty-protecting 
rationale for habeas corpus as “conventional thinking”). 
 11 See, e.g., Stephen I. Vladeck, Boumediene’s Quiet Theory: Access to Courts and the 
Separation of Powers, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2107, 2141–50 (2009) [hereinafter Vla-
deck, Quiet Theory] (arguing that Boumediene is best understood as a case regarding 
the importance of habeas and the Suspension Clause for separation of powers); Ste-
phen I. Vladeck, Congress, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Separation of Powers After 
Hamdan, 16 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 933, 956–62 (2007) (interpreting the 
Hamdan decision as affirming separation of powers values).  For a skeptical view of 
habeas as a mechanism for separation of powers values, see Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., 
Creating Legal Rights for Suspected Terrorists: Is the Court Being Courageous or Politically 
Pragmatic?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1975, 2039 (2009) (“[I]t is Kafkaesque for the ma-
jority to invoke ‘separation of powers’ as a justification for dismantling two bulwarks 
of that doctrine, congressional control over federal jurisdiction and the political 
question doctrine.”). 
 12 See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal Procedure, 99 
MICH. L. REV. 48, 48–50 (2000) (arguing that landmark Supreme Court habeas cases 
involving the review of criminal convictions of African American defendants in 
southern state courts can be understood as enforcing national rule of law norms on 
recalcitrant southern courts); see also David J. Garrow, Bad Behavior Makes Big Law: 
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Without taking anything away from these viewpoints, this Article 
offers another lens through which to view habeas corpus, suggesting 
that habeas operates to address the informational asymmetries de-
scribed above.  Our structural analysis understands habeas corpus as 
an “information-forcing” procedural mechanism, a concept that we 
borrow from contract theory. 
In this Article, we will provide an overview of what we mean by 
“information forcing” and show how it applies in the habeas context.  
We will then set forth some of the institutional incentives that a ro-
bust information-forcing understanding of habeas corpus would pro-
vide to different institutional actors.  We will also offer an explana-
tion of how the information-forcing paradigm can help explain 
existing doctrine and offer some normative observations about how 
cases should be resolved in the future. 
The Article proceeds in four parts.  Part I explains the concept 
of information-forcing penalty default rules, which developed origi-
nally in private law scholarship, and explains how this idea can be 
helpful to public law scholars as well.  It then explains how the con-
cept can apply in the context of habeas corpus.  Part II surveys the 
history of habeas corpus jurisprudence in England and America to 
demonstrate that habeas, as it has been understood over time, has al-
ways operated in an information-forcing manner.  Part III discusses 
how a rigorous commitment to allowing habeas corpus to mitigate 
the informational asymmetries enjoyed by the executive would create 
positive incentives for each of the institutional actors relevant to con-
troversies about executive detention policy—the detained individuals, 
the legislature, the judiciary, and the public itself.  Finally, Part IV 
analyzes the development of habeas corpus jurisprudence in connec-
tion with the “War on Terror” to demonstrate how this paradigm can 
be used to illuminate existing doctrine and offers normative guid-
ance to the future development of the law. 
I. INFORMATION FORCING 
In this Part, we offer a background and critical history of the 
concept of information-forcing procedural devices.  We begin by 
briefly explaining what an information-forcing device is, then outline 
the concept’s origins in contract theory.  We then trace how scholars 
in disparate areas have adopted the idea and explain how it has de-
veloped beyond its original context as it has expanded. 
 
Southern Malfeasance and the Expansion of Federal Judicial Power, 1954–1968, 82 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 1, 1–3 (2008). 
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A. Default Rules and Information-Forcing Devices in Contract Theory 
Private law scholars have frequently analyzed the problem of in-
formation asymmetries in the context of contract theory.  Contract 
scholars have developed a theory of “penalty default rules,” which 
predicts that courts will redress inefficiencies and unfairness that 
might result from asymmetric information by establishing “penalty 
default rules.”  These default rules penalize the party with the supe-
rior information if it fails to come forward and affirmatively contract 
around the harsh default, in the process revealing the information 
that it possesses. 
The term “information-forcing” is especially associated with the 
work of Ian Ayres and his collaborators, and with their studies of the 
role of default rules in structuring private ordering via contract bar-
gaining.
13
  In its simplest form, Ayres’s theory of the importance of 
default rules derives from the observation that all contract bargaining 
occurs against the backdrop of the default rules that apply absent a 
specific bargain to the contrary; the scholarship analyzes the role that 




 13 The leading article that inaugurated the discussion of penalty defaults in con-
tract theory is Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Eco-
nomic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989) [hereinafter Ayres & Gertner, Fill-
ing Gaps]. See generally Ian Ayres, Ya-Huh: There Are and Should Be Penalty Defaults, 33 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 589 (2006) (answering critics); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Majo-
ritarian vs. Minoritarian Defaults, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1591 (1999) (providing a mathemat-
ical model to predict when a penalty—or minoritarian—default rule will be more ef-
ficient than a majoritarian one).  The literature on default rules in contract theory is 
extensive.  For an overview, see Richard Craswell, Contract Law: General Theories, in 3 
THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW & ECONOMICS § 4000, at 5–9 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Ger-
rit De Geest eds., 2000).  For further discussion, see Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. 
Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis for Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261, 
1300 (1980) (arguing that the Hadley rule—discussed infra notes 21–26 and accom-
panying text—can increase efficiency by stimulating the provision of information be-
tween bargainers); Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial 
Contracts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 597, 609–11 (1990) (discussing the problem of unantici-
pated costs arising from breach of contract and noting that courts typically will not 
expand a contract to provide for them where the parties have not bargained for a 
protection against them).  For a critical view of penalty default rule thinking, see Eric 
A. Posner, There Are No Penalty Default Rules in Contract Law, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 563, 
565–72 (2006) (arguing that, as an empirical matter, none of the rules held up as ex-
amples of penalty defaults actually were penalty defaults); Alan Schwartz, The Default 
Rule Paradigm and the Limits of Contract Law, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 389, 390 (1993) 
(“[Default rule] scholarship is illuminating but less helpful than it could be . . .  [be-
cause] there are several types of default rules but the literature does not distinguish 
adequately among them.”). 
 14 Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps, supra note 13, at 89–95. 
FALKOFF AND CONNOLLY_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/7/2011  1:39 PM 
1366 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1361 
One form of default rule that Ayres highlights is what he refers 
to as a “penalty default.”
15
  A penalty default rule is a default rule that 
applies a particularly harsh outcome on one or both parties if they do 
not contract around it.
16
  An example from Ayres’s early work is the 
typical default rules that govern what happens in a real estate transac-
tion if a buyer breaches a contract to buy a house and therefore for-
feits an “earnest money” deposit.
17
  If the contract between the seller 
and the seller’s real estate agent is silent as to how to allocate the de-
posit, then the entire deposit belongs to the seller, and the broker 
gets nothing.
18
 Ayres observed that this default rule creates an incen-
tive for the broker, who is presumably the party with greater know-
ledge and expertise in real estate transactions, to raise the issue af-
firmatively and specifically contract for the disposition of any 
forfeited proceeds.
19
  In Ayres’s terminology, it operates as a “penalty” 
to the broker—who otherwise benefits from an information asymme-




The classic example of a penalty default rule is found in the well-
known case of Hadley v. Baxendale.
21
  In Hadley, a miller contracted 
with a freight carrier for the carrier to transport a crankshaft to the 
mill.
22
  The contract was silent as to which party bore the risk of any 
delays in the shipment.  When the shipment was delayed by a consi-
derable period of time, the mill had to shut down, and the miller suf-
fered consequential damages in the form of lost profits.
23
  The miller 
sued the carrier to recover the lost profits, and the court denied the 
claim.
24
  The court held that in the absence of any express allocation 
of the risk of delay, the miller could not recover, reasoning that the 
miller knew that time was of the essence and that he would be eco-
nomically injured by any delay, yet he failed to contract for any penal-
ty for failure to make a timely delivery.
25
  Because (1) the miller knew 
that he faced losses for delay, (2) the carrier did not know about the 
 
 15 Id. at 95–107. 
 16 Id. at 97–98. 
 17 Id. at 98–99. 
 18 Id.  
 19 Id. 
 20 Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps, supra note 13, at 99.  
 21 (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex.). 
 22 Id. at 146.  
 23 Id.  
 24 Id.  
 25 Id. at 149.  
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miller’s risk, and (3) the miller did not act to protect his interests, the 
miller could not recover.
26
  In other words, the court imposed a de-
fault rule that will operate as a penalty to the customer unless he af-
firmatively contracts around it.
27
 
Ayres interprets leading decisions like Hadley as showing that, in 
Anglo-American contract law, common-law courts often develop pe-
nalty default rules that impose harsh consequences on parties that 
possess information not easily available to the counter-party.
28
  Accor-
dingly, the information-advantaged party has an incentive to avoid 
the penalty by contracting around it; this avoidance has the effect, 
however, of forcing that party to disclose the information to which 
only it has access. 
B. Information-Forcing Procedures in a Wider Context 
The debate over the idea of penalty default rules engendered 
within contract scholarship has led scholars in other fields to ask 
whether this concept might illuminate issues beyond contract law.
29
  
As a result, the idea has traveled far beyond the realm of contract into 
other areas of private law and increasingly into public law scholarship 
as well. 
One feature of this follow-on scholarship in other fields is that 
the application of the “information-forcing” concept has been more 
general and has not tracked the contract-based origins of the idea.  
For example, corporate law scholars Scott Baker, Stephen Choi, and 
Mitu Gulati reached for the idea of an information-forcing procedur-
al structure in their essay on the “tournament model” in law firm 
evaluation and promotion decisions.
30
  As Baker, Choi, and Gulati 
explain, although the much-despised focus on billable hours see-
mingly built into the path to partnership in most large corporate law 
 
 26 Hadley, 156 Eng. Rep. at 151–52. 
 27 See generally id.  
 28 Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps, supra note 13, at 101–02. 
 29 See, e.g., infra notes 31–42 and accompanying text. 
 30 See generally Scott Baker et al., The Rat Race as an Information-Forcing Device, 81 
IND. L.J. 53 (2006).  For more on the tournament model of law firm structure, see 
generally MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM (1991); Marc Galanter & William Henderson, 
The Elastic Tournament: A Second Transformation of the Big Law Firm, 60 STAN. L. REV. 
1867 (2008); David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Reconceiving the Tournament of Law-
yers: Tracking, Seeding, and Information Control in the Internal Labor Markets of Elite Law 
Firms, 84 VA. L. REV. 1581 (1998).   
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firms has been criticized as harmful to both associates and law firms,
31
 
it likely persists because the stressful situations that the tournament 
structure creates operate to force young lawyers to reveal certain im-
portant facts that allow measurement of intangible metrics—
including judgment, internal motivation, and the ability to work un-
der pressure without alienating staff and colleagues—that are other-
wise difficult to measure.
32
  In this account, information forcing has 
less to do with incentives to disclose information by contracting 
around defaults and more with structural features of institutions that 
work to compel disclosure.
33
 
This less-formalized conception of information forcing particu-
larly lends itself to the analysis of public law issues, where the gov-
ernment will frequently be one “party” to a relationship and will gen-
erally not be a negotiating partner.  For example, in a highly original 
article, Elizabeth Emens analyzes the ways in which polyamourous 
persons—individuals who are drawn to romantic or family relation-
ships that involve three or more people rather than the more tradi-
tional pairs—must arrange families and intimate lives against the 
backdrop of state family law.
34
  Emens argues that these state laws, 
which tend to presume monogamous relationships, are best unders-
tood as information-forcing default rules.
35
  In her analysis, the law’s 
default to monogamy should serve primarily as an explicit backdrop 
against which those persons who wish to make different arrange-





 31 Baker et al., supra note 30, at 56; see, e.g., Susan Saab Fortney, Soul for Sale: An 
Empirical Study of Associate Satisfaction, Law Firm Culture, and the Effects of Billable Hour 
Requirements, 69 UMKC L. REV. 239, 292–93 (2000) (detailing the way that pressure to 
bill hours harms young lawyers and creates risks for law firms). 
 32 Baker et al., supra note 30, at 56–60.  
 33 Choi and Gulati elsewhere similarly argue that public ordinal rankings systems, 
for all of their flaws, serve an information-forcing role because they force institutions 
to make public—in an attempt to influence or mitigate ratings’ performance—
information that would otherwise remain internal.  See Stephen J. Choi et al., Judicial 
Evaluations and Information Forcing: Ranking State High Courts and Their Judges, 58 DUKE 
L.J. 1313, 1363 (2009). 
 34 Elizabeth N. Emens, Monogamy’s Law: Compulsory Monogamy and Polyamorous Ex-
istence, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 277 (2004); see also Margaret F. Brinig, Penal-
ty Defaults in Family Law: The Case of Child Custody, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 779 (2006) 
(applying penalty default rule concepts to family law). 
 35 Emens, supra note 34, at 285–86. 
 36 Id. at 371–75.  For example, Emens suggests that where legal rules make mo-
nogamy the default option, persons who wish to be in non-monogamous relation-
ships must come forward early in the relationship and ask for an explicit agreement 
to the contrary, or else face the “penalty” of being held to the default standard.  Id.  
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The study that is most enabling of our analysis here is John Fere-
john and Barry Friedman’s contribution to a symposium at the Flori-
da State University College of Law on “Default Rules in Public and 
Private Law.”
37
  In their article, Ferejohn and Friedman explore the 
theoretical implications of applying default rule thinking in the do-
main of constitutional law, noting the conceptual challenges to such 
an approach, but also arguing that “default rules are pervasive and 
likely inevitable in constitutional law.”
38
  They lay out the different 
forms that default rules may take in constitutional law and argue that 
penalty defaults operate in this area primarily in the form of judicially 
enforced rules that require the government to disclose information 
or face an undesirable outcome.
39
  For example, they point to the 
probable cause requirement in criminal law, which obligates the 
prosecution to reveal facts about its case or face dismissal, or the 
criminal discovery obligations announced in the Brady decision.
40
 
Ferejohn and Friedman view habeas corpus through the lens of 
penalty default, writing that in instances when the government fails to 
disclose the reasons for detention, “the penalty—release of the pris-
oner—is sufficiently harsh that the executive is forced to reveal any 
information it has justifying detention.”
41
 
C. Information-Forcing Habeas Corpus 
This Article follows Ferejohn and Friedman in viewing habeas 
corpus as operating structurally as an information-forcing penalty de-
fault.  To be sure, for the petitioner the ultimate goal is release from 
detention.  As a structural matter, however, the way habeas tradition-
ally operates is as a demand, enforceable by the judicial authority, 
that the sovereign come forward and justify the detention of the pris-
oner.
42
  Although very often the sovereign will carry that burden, the 
threat of an order of release (or at least of a showdown with the judi-
ciary that may expose the sovereign as lawless) creates a powerful in-
 
She further suggests that a legal rule that sets the opposite default might be even 
more productive of candid discussions about what rules the parties in the relation-
ship truly want.  Id. at 373–74. 
 37 John Ferejohn & Barry Friedman, Toward a Political Theory of Constitutional De-
fault Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 825 (2006). 
 38 Id. at 827. 
 39 Id.  
 40 Id. at 846–47 (discussing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)). 
 41 Id. at 846.  
 42 See 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (2006). 
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centive for the sovereign to make some response.
43
  If arbitrary depri-
vations of liberty are the core injury that habeas has evolved to pro-
tect, the process for compelling the state to justify its detention, even 
more than release, is at the core of how habeas protects liberty.
44
  Our 
claim is that courts, when faced with a petition for habeas corpus that 
falls outside of the codified systems of collateral review of state court 
convictions, should be guided by the core value of information dis-
closure.  As we discuss later, this principle has unfortunately not al-
ways been followed. 
 II.  HABEAS CORPUS AND ASCERTAINING THE “CAUSE” OF THE 
DETENTION 
In Part I we set forth what we hope is a conceptually appealing 
account of how habeas corpus functions in our constitutional system.  
In this Part, we try to show that this account is consistent with, and 
explains, the actual historical practice of habeas corpus in Anglo-
American law.  Much of the history of the writ has been concerned 
with “information forcing”—that is, with requiring the jailer to articu-
late publicly the reasons for the arrest and detention of a prisoner.
45
  
Indeed, the focus of the courts has historically been more about de-
vising means to learn about the circumstances of a prisoner’s deten-
tion than about protecting the prisoner’s “rights” per se.
46
  In this Part, 
 
 43 See Judith Resnik, Detention, The War on Terror, and the Federal Courts: An Essay in 
Honor of Henry Monaghan, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 579 (2010). 
 44 Resnik makes a similar point in a long essay that has been influential on our 
thinking about these matters.  See id. at 667–69.  “For hundreds of years, habeas cor-
pus has authorized an individual to require an accounting by the government in pub-
lic.”  Id. at 668. 
 45 See generally Marc D. Falkoff, Back to Basics: Habeas Corpus Procedures and Long-
Term Executive Detention, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 961, 971 (2009). 
 46 See, e.g., PAUL D. HALLIDAY, HABEAS CORPUS: FROM ENGLAND TO EMPIRE 14 
(2010) (“[H]abeas corpus was fundamentally an instrument of judicial power de-
rived from the king’s prerogative, a power more concerned with the wrongs of jailers 
than with the rights of prisoners.”); R.J. SHARPE, THE LAW OF HABEAS CORPUS 2 (1976) 
(“The words ‘habeas corpus’ at this early stage [from medieval times through the 
thirteenth century] were not connected with the idea of liberty, and the process in-
volved an element of the concept of due process of law only in so far as it mirrored 
the refusal of the courts to decide a matter without having the defendant present.”); 
Falkoff, supra note 45, at 966 (“Habeas corpus . . . has thus historically not been a 
substantive ‘right’ that someone possesses so much as it has been an evolving set of 
procedures through which the right to be free from illegal detention may be vindi-
cated.”); cf. Marc D. Falkoff & Robert Knowles, Bagram, Boumediene, and Limited 
Government, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 851, 851 (2010) (arguing that the extraterritorial 
reach of the Suspension Clause is best determined by looking to the limited powers 
granted to government by the Constitution rather than by trying to ascertain what 
“rights” a petitioner might possess). 
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we briefly review the history of the development of the writ’s “return” 
requirement, which forces the jailer to explain to the courts the cause 
of the prisoner’s detention. 
Magna Carta established in the early thirteenth century that an 
English subject could be imprisoned only in accord with the “law of 
the land,”
47
 but it took centuries for the courts to devise an effective 
set of procedures for determining whether a detention was or was not 
legal.
48
  By the middle of the fourteenth century, the courts had fa-
shioned a writ called habeas corpus cum causa, which required the jailer 
both to produce in court the body of the prisoner and, for the first 
time, to explain the reason for the detention.
49
  This power to force 
the jailer to articulate the cause of the detention provided the courts 
with a potentially powerful tool for overseeing the authority of state 
actors to infringe on the liberty of an English subject. 
At first, however, the courts (including the common law courts, 
Chancery, the ecclesiastical courts, and Admiralty) exercised this 
power primarily to move cases from one court to another in endless 
battles over jurisdiction.
50
  It was not until the sixteenth century that 
the courts began using the cum causa writ in efforts to protect their 
jurisdiction from infringement by the executive branch—and in par-
ticular, the King’s Privy Council—as well.
51
  Indeed, over the course of 
the sixteenth century, the King’s Bench developed a new form of the 
writ, habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, which was designed in particular to 
protect subjects against deprivations of liberty by officers of the state 
and the Privy Council by requiring them to explain to the courts the 
legal cause for their detention orders.
52
 
An assembly of judges resolved in 1592 that it was not enough 
for a jailer to tell the court that a detention was justified simply be-
cause a single privy councilor had ordered it.
53
  Instead, the writ of 
habeas corpus was to be answered, or “returned,” with the specifics of 
the reasons for the detention, so that the court could determine its 
 
 47 Magna Carta, c. 39 (J.C. Holt trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1965) (1215) 
(“[N]o free man shall be seized or imprisoned . . . except by the lawful judgment of 
his peers or by the law of the land.”).  
 48 See generally Falkoff, supra note 45, at 966–69. 
 49 Id. at 967 & n.31.  
 50 See WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 33–40 
(1980) (describing the jurisdictional battles); SHARPE, supra note 46, at 4–7 (same). 
 51 See DUKER, supra note 50, at 41. 
 52 J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 126–27 (2d ed. 1979).  
 53 See Falkoff, supra note 45, at 969. 
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legality.
54
  Generally speaking, therefore, by the end of the sixteenth 
century, the English courts possessed a tool for requiring the execu-




In practice, however, this power to force the executive to explain 
its reasons for a particular detention often proved toothless.  The 
same assembly of judges in 1592 had stated in their resolution that 
“general” returns—those which did not specify the particulars of a 
detention—were acceptable when they stated that the detention had 
been authorized by the entire Privy Council,
56
 or by the monarch 
himself or herself.
57
  In part, this was justified by the need for the ex-
ecutive to avoid the “great inconvenience” of having, for example, to 
reveal state secrets.
58
  Through the early seventeenth century, there-
fore, the state could detain subjects without giving the courts an ac-
counting of the legal cause of the detention, at least when acting 
through the King or Queen, or through the entire Privy Council. 
Unsurprisingly, this power was politically controversial.  It led 
Parliament to twice attempt to enhance by statute the habeas powers 
of the courts, in 1593 and 1621.
59
  These bills, which would have re-
quired the cause of all detentions to be explained to the courts, did 
not pass, setting the stage for the famous Darnel’s Case (also known as 
The Five Knights’ Case) in 1627.
60
 
Darnel’s Case involved a habeas corpus petition filed by five 
knights who had been imprisoned for refusing to make a loan that 
had been ordered by Charles I without Parliament’s sanction.
61
  In re-
sponse to the writ, the attorney general stated no more than that the 
knights’ detention was legal because the King had ordered it (and 
that it was therefore, by definition, in accord with the “law of the 
land”).
62
  Following precedent, the King’s Bench accepted this gener-
 
 54  Id. 
 55 See Resolution, 1 And. 297 (1592).  
 56 Ruswell’s Case, (1615) 1 Rolle 192, 192 (K.B.); Salkingstowe’s Case, (1615) 1 
Rolle 219, 219 (K.B.); Les Bruer’s Case, (1614) 1 Rolle 134, 134 (K.B.); see also 
HALLIDAY, supra note 46, at 26.  
 57 See Addis’s Case, (1610) Cro. Jac. 219 (K.B.) (addressing challenge to adequacy 
of return that stated only that prisoner was being held “for certain matters concern-
ing the King”).  
 58 See HALLIDAY, supra note 46, at 154. 
 59 See SHARPE, supra note 46, at 9 (discussing defeat of bills in 1593 and 1621). 
 60 (1627) 3 How. St. Tr. 1 (K.B.). 
 61 Id. at 2. 
 62 Id. at 38-41. 
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al or no-cause “return” to the writ as adequate legal justification for 
the detention and refused to order the release of the petitioners.
63
 
This decision was controversial.  Hard on the heels of Darnel’s 
Case, Parliament complained in the Petition of Right in 1627 that 
Charles I had imprisoned subjects “without any cause showed,” even 
after a habeas petition had required a return to the writ.
64
  The Peti-
tion of Right stated that “no freeman shall be imprisoned or detained 
contrary to the law of the land,”
65
  which, of course, begs the question 
of whether or not an order of detention made by the King or his full 
Privy Council is in accord with the law of the land. Subsequent to pas-
sage of the Petition of Right, however, Charles I did not change prac-
tice with respect to issuing general returns to the habeas writ because 
he denied that the petition had the force of law.
66
 
Parliament soon acted again, passing the Habeas Corpus Act of 
1641.
67
  This statute specifically provided that anyone imprisoned by a 
privy councilor, or by the King or the entire Privy Council, could ask 
the courts for a writ of habeas corpus, and that the jailer supply the 
courts with the “true cause” of—or the particular justification for—
the detention.
68
  The act was not effective in practice, however, for 
several reasons.  It was unclear, for example, whether the writ could 
be issued during the vacation time of the courts, which led to lengthy 
detentions.
69
  In addition, in order to avoid judicial oversight of de-
 
 63 Id. at 31. 
 64 The Petition of Right stated that when subjects had been  
brought before [the] justices by [his] Majesty’s writs of habeas corpus, . 
. . [and] their keepers [were] commanded to certify the causes of their 
detainer, no cause was certified, but that they were detained by [his] 
Majesty’s special command, signified by the lords of your Privy Council, 
and yet were returned back to several prisoners, without being charged 
with anything to which they might make answer according to the law. 
Petition of Right, 1627, 3 Car. 1, c. 1 (Eng.).  Paul D. Halliday has recently argued 
that the importance of Parliament’s Petition of Right has been exaggerated because 
the courts had already ended Privy Council no-cause returns.  HALLIDAY, supra note 
46, at 139.  Halliday notes that writs were issued for no-cause returns about thirty  
percent of the time in the seventeenth century, and more than half of the writs that 
were issued occurred after 1628.  Id. at 154. 
 65 Petition of Right, 1627, 3 Car. 1, c. 1 (Eng.). 
 66 See Six Members’ Case, (1629) 3 St. Tr. 235, 240 (K.B.).  Nonetheless, as Paul 
D. Halliday has argued, the courts still looked “behind” the return to find facts, and 
thus issued the writ based upon alternative methods of fact-finding.  HALLIDAY, supra 
note 46, at 223. 
 67 16 Car. 1, c. 10 (Eng.).  
 68 Id. 
 69 See, e.g., SIR EDWARD COKE, THE FOURTH PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND 81 (1644) (suggesting that neither the King’s Bench nor Common Pleas 
courts could issue habeas writs during vacation).  But see HALLIDAY, supra note 46, at 
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tentions, jailers transported prisoners to Scotland or other areas 
where the writ was hypothesized not to reach.
70
  The effect was that a 




These and other “pitiful evasions”
72
 led Parliament to pass the 
heralded Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, which clarified from which 
courts the writ could issue, when the writ was available, and how 
quickly the jailer must show cause to the court for the legality of the 
detention.
73
  Among the many detailed provisions of the act was the 
requirement that the court, upon receiving an inadequate “return” to 
the writ, release the prisoner from detention.
74
  These were the pro-




Habeas has, therefore, historically been about forcing the execu-
tive to bring information about detention decisions into the public 
sphere, even when the executive does not want to do so—or else suf-
fer the penalty of a judicial order releasing the prisoner from custo-
dy. 
III. INFORMATION FORCING AND INSTITUTIONAL INCENTIVES 
The history set forth in Part II correlates with our further sugges-
tion that habeas and its procedures should be understood as operat-
ing to flush information out of the sole possession of the executive or 
 
55–58 (arguing that it is a “longstanding misapprehension” that the courts could not 
do so). 
 70 See, e.g., HALLIDAY, supra note 46, at 216 (noting that the “first experiments with 
sending prisoners to insular places in hopes of keeping them beyond the writ’s 
reach” took place during the Interregnum by the Council of State); see also SHARPE, 
supra note 46, at 17–18 (listing other abuses). 
 71 As Blackstone suggested, “confinement of the person, by secretly hurrying him 
to gaol, where his sufferings are unknown or forgotten, is a less public, a less striking, 
and therefore a more dangerous engine of arbitrary Government.”  1 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 136 (Neill H. Alford, Jr. et al. 
eds., The Legal Classics Library 1983) (1768); see also id. at 138 (“[Habeas is a] reme-
dy the more necessary, because the oppression does not always arise from the ill-
nature, but sometimes from the mere inattention, of Government.  For it frequently 
happens in foreign countries . . . that persons apprehended upon suspicion have suf-
fered a long imprisonment, merely because they were forgotten.”). 
 72 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 134 (Neill H. 
Alford, Jr. et al. eds., The Legal Classics Library 1983) (1768). 
 73 310 Car. 2, c. 2 (Eng.). 
 74 Id. ¶ 7. 
 75 “The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless 
when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”  U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 9, cl. 2.   
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military because enhancing the amount and quality of the informa-
tion about particular detention decisions benefits the democratic 
process in a variety of ways.  In this Part, we explain the incentives 
that various institutional actors would face if robust commitment to 
the information-forcing values that we advocate were consistently ap-
plied. 
The Detainees.  This group is the most obvious beneficiary of a 
strong information forcing system.  In many contexts—certainly in 
criminal prosecutions, but also in many immigration proceedings as 
well—a person who is being detained will have been informed of the 
reason for his detention, and on what authority he is being detained, 
as part of the ordinary course of procedure.
76
  As we explained above, 
however, as a normative matter a person being detained by the Unit-
ed States always has the right to be informed of this information, even 
absent a specific statutory scheme, if the writ is properly applied.
77
 
As we have seen from the Guantánamo litigation, the detainee 
who seeks a writ of habeas corpus may well have little or no informa-
tion about why he is being detained.  As a result, even aside from 
whatever limits there may be on his access to court proceedings, the 
detainee might have little insight about how to explain to his jailer 
that his detention is unwarranted.  Furthermore, although habeas is 
traditionally thought of as a mechanism to obtain the release of a 
prisoner, the Kafka example with which we began reminds us that de-
tention without explanation or a meaningful opportunity to contest 
the detention is itself an injury.  Even when a reviewing court deter-
mines that a person’s detention is lawful—even when that court de-
termines that it lacks authority to order the relief of release—it is still 
 
 76 Under the rubric of national security, successive administrations have increa-
singly attempted to keep information secret even in court proceedings involving de-
privations of liberty, such as immigration detentions.  A discussion of this practice is 
beyond the scope of this Article, but such secrecy obviously runs counter to the de-
mocracy and accountability-promoting effects we urge for habeas corpus.  For more 
on secrecy in non-criminal detention proceedings, see, e.g., Jonathan Hafetz, Habeas 
Corpus, Judicial Review, and Limits on Secrecy in Detentions at Guantánamo, 5 CARDOZO 
PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 127, 129–35 (2006) (discussing the government’s attempts 
to keep Guantánamo detention completely secret); Jaya Ramji-Nogales, A Global Ap-
proach to Secret Evidence: How Human Rights Law Can Reform Our Immigration System, 39 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 287, 295–303 (2008) (providing an overview of the use of 
secrecy in immigration proceedings).  
 77 See supra notes 52–75 and accompanying text (discussing the role of the return 
in habeas procedure). 
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One especially striking example of this situation involved Abdul-
la Kamel al Kandari, a Kuwaiti who was taken into custody in Afgha-
nistan and transferred to Guantánamo Bay in 2002.
79
  As part of his 
interrogation, Kandari was asked about an alias purportedly found on 
a computer that was allegedly owned by a senior al Qaeda leader.
80
  
The government refused to tell him what the alias was, whose com-
puter it was found on, or when the computer was seized.
81
  In the face 
of this truly Kafkaesque situation, it was obviously impossible for the 
prisoner to explain the alleged alias, argue that it was not his, or 
point his interrogators towards another person whose alias it may 
have been.
82
  Even if Kandari had in fact used an alias, he could not 
verify that this particular word or name was his actual alias.  As the 
purported alias was one of the main pieces of evidence justifying his 
continued detention, he had no reasonable basis to argue for his re-
lease. 
Although this example may be extreme, the so-called “War on 
Terror” detention policy of the Bush and Obama administrations of-
fers a sad catalog of the breakdown of the disclosure regime we have 
come to expect in the types of domestic detention scenarios Ameri-
can lawyers are more used to seeing.  The fact is that once courts are 
operating outside of the familiar and codified procedural systems 
with which they are acquainted, they are often reluctant to follow the 
traditional habeas requirement of the return.  Furthermore, the fact 
that the executive branch officials are willing—if not eager—to forgo 
justifying detention, strongly reinforces the urgent necessity that in-
formation forcing be understood as a crucial function of habeas in 
our constitutional system. 
 
 78 For example, within international human rights law, Article 9(2) of the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights recognizes the right of “[a]nyone 
who is arrested” to “be informed, at the time of arrest, of the reasons for his arrest 
and [to] be promptly informed of any charges against him.”  G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A, 
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966). 
 79 Tom Lasseter, Guantánamo Inmate Database: Abdulla Kamel al Kandari, 
MCCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS,  http://services.mcclatchyinteractive.com/detainees/20 
(last visited Sep. 19, 2011). 
 80 Id.  
 81 Id. 
 82 Id.  Kandari was repatriated to Kuwait in the fall of 2006.  Given that informa-
tion-gathering is alleged to be one of the important functions of the Guantánamo 
system of detention, it is striking how this strong commitment to secrecy can under-
mine the intelligence-gathering function that supposedly authorizes the detention 
process in the first place. 
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The Legislature.  The effects on the legislative branch of a rigor-
ous information-forcing approach to habeas corpus are more compli-
cated, because the legislature typically operates at some remove from 
the habeas process.  We make two arguments regarding the legisla-
ture. 
First, to the extent that Congress has authority over the statutory 
backdrop against which the executive branch’s detention policy deci-
sions play out—either by enacting new statutes or by declining to act 
to modify, rescind, or amend existing statutes—it obviously has the 
capacity to influence the range of possible actions available to the ex-
ecutive.
83
  Courts in our system are often urged to defer judgments 
about difficult policy matters—especially the kind of national securi-
ty, immigration, and law enforcement matters implicated in habeas 
decisions—to the politically accountable branches.
84
  However, if the 
executive is permitted to detain people without disclosure, it is diffi-
cult for Congress to properly monitor the executive’s exercise of its 
authorized powers, and difficult for the electorate to subject the legis-
lature to political accountability.  As public choice theory predicts,
85
 
Congress in fact often chooses to leave extensive discretion in deten-
 
 83 See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil Libertarianism and 
Executive Unilateralism: An Institutional Process Approach to Rights During Wartime, 5 
THEORETICAL INQ. LAW 1, 8–9 (2003) (arguing that the legislative branch has often 
set the terms for the executive’s exercise of seemingly unilateral powers); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Administrative Law Goes to War, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2663, 2665–67 (2005) 
(applying administrative law principles to argue that the first question in judicial re-
view of executive action is whether the legislative grant of authority also includes a 
delegation of interpretive authority as well). 
 84 See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 
649, 654–63 (2000) (reviewing judicial deference to the executive branch in foreign 
affairs); Julian Ku & John C. Yoo, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Functional Case For Foreign 
Affairs Deference To The Executive Branch, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 179, 199–205 (2006); 
Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 
1170, 1193–1217 (2007) (calling for deference to executive interpretations of sta-
tutes relating to foreign affairs); Mark Tushnet, Controlling Executive Power in the War 
on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2673, 2679 (2005); Mark Tushnet, Law and Prudence in 
the Law of Justiciability: The Transformation and Disappearance of the Political Question Doc-
trine, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1203, 1206 n.19, 1211–12 (2002); John Yoo, Courts at War, 91 
CORNELL L. REV. 573, 590–600 (2006).  But see Robert M. Chesney, National Security 
Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 1361, 1422–33 (2009) (reviewing judicial deference to 
executive branch fact-finding and concluding that it is not warranted in many cases); 
Amanda L. Tyler, Is Suspension a Political Question?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 333, 402–08 
(2006) (expressing skepticism about the extent of foreign affairs deference re-
quired).  
 85 See Peter H. Aranson, Ernest Gellhorn & Glen O. Robinson, A Theory of Legisla-
tive Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 55–62 (1982); Richard J. Pierce, The Role of Con-
stitutional and Political Theory in Administrative Law, 64 TEX. L. REV. 469, 490–91 
(1985).  
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tion decisions to the executive, thereby providing itself with a kind of 
plausible deniability about detention policy.  The requirement of the 
return allows information to enter the public sphere and eventually 
allows the public to assess the prisoners’ detention and determine 
whether the executive has been acting appropriately.
86
  Robust infor-
mation forcing, therefore, improves accountability, both electorally 
and between the political branches. 
Second, we believe that the courts can properly effect a further 
desirable form of information forcing through the quintessentially 
judicial activity of statutory interpretation.  Scholars of statutory in-
terpretation have identified a specific type of information-forcing de-
fault rule known as a “preference-eliciting” rule, whereby an ambi-
guous statute is construed by the court in a manner that forces the 
legislature to articulate more clearly what rule it would like to see en-
forced.
87
  According to this account, judicial canons of interpretations 
such as clear statement rules operate by establishing a default rule 
that the legislature may not have intended or desired, thereby lead-
ing the legislature to revisit the issue and enact a more specific and 
clear statute to accomplish its legislative goals.
88
 
In the context of habeas corpus and executive detention, courts 
should employ clear statement or other preference-eliciting rules to 
construe statutes that derogate habeas rights narrowly, ensuring that 
only unambiguous pronouncements by Congress will restrict the 
 
 86 A discussion of the democracy and accountability enhancing aspects of infor-
mation forcing habeas is beyond the scope of this Article, but we address it more 
specifically in a future article.  We are grateful for Professor Jonathan Hafetz’s in-
formal reminder that, to the extent the executive can keep the contents of the return 
classified, the democracy-promoting aspects of habeas will be muted.  We agree that 
classification inhibits this function (and would argue that is a reason courts should 
be reluctant to seal such materials), but we also contend that there is a benefit even 
in disclosure to the detainee or his counsel.  Moreover, even in the Guantánamo liti-
gation, with all of its restrictions, a substantial amount of information at odds with 
the official government narrative was able to make its way into the press.  See MARK 
DENBEAUX ET AL., REPORT ON GUANTÁNAMO DETAINEES: A PROFILE OF 517 DETAINEES 
THROUGH ANALYSIS OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DATA 2 (2006), available at 
http://law.shu.edu/publications/guantanamoReports/guantanamo_report_final_2_
08_06.pdf; see also infra text accompanying notes 99–102 (discussing  Mark Den-
beaux’s report).  
 87 See Einer Elhague, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 
2162, 2165 (2002). 
 88 Id. at 2168–91.  For more on clear statement rules, see generally William N. Es-
kridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules As Consti-
tutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593 (1992); John F. Manning, Clear Statement 
Rules and the Constitution, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 399 (2010).  
FALKOFF AND CONNOLLY_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/7/2011  1:39 PM 
2011] INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRIES 1379 
scope of habeas.
89
  To take the example of the Guantánamo litigation, 
application of a preference-eliciting information-default rule helps 
explain the Supreme Court’s decisions in Rasul v. Bush (construing 
28 U.S.C. § 2241)
90
 and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (construing the Detainee 
Treatment Act (DTA)).
91
  In both of these cases, the Court made 
clear to Congress, in essence, that if it wanted to strip the courts of 




The Public.  A rarely acknowledged beneficiary of habeas is the 
public itself.  When the government acts in secret, there is no way for 
citizens to determine whether the President’s detention decisions are 
in accord with the values or expectations of the national community.  
Secrecy keeps the public from exercising its franchise in an informed 
manner, forcing citizens to vote based on second-order decisions 
(about the refusal of the executive branch to reveal information), ra-
ther than on first-order decisions (about whether a particular detai-
nee or class of detainees should have been arrested and imprisoned at 
all). 
Consider some of the ways in which the Guantánamo habeas lit-
igation has shaped the national debate about our detention policies.  
Prior to the Supreme Court’s 2004 decision in Rasul—holding that 
the federal courts had statutory jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions 
filed by Guantánamo prisoners
93
—the American public knew almost 
nothing about the detainees at Guantánamo, aside from political 
pronouncements about their being among the “worst of the worst” 
and assurances—later proven false—that the prison housed men who 
were “picked up on the battlefield fighting American forces, trying to 
kill American forces.”
94
  Neither lawyers nor the press were allowed 
 
 89 See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 299 (2001); Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. 
Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, Substantive Rights, and the War on Terror, 120 HARV. 
L. REV. 2029, 2033 (2007); Daniel A. Farber, Justice Stevens, Habeas Jurisdiction, and the 
War on Terror, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 945, 967–68 (2010).  
 90 542 U.S. 466, 480–84 (2004). 
 91 548 U.S. 557, 572–84 (2006). 
 92 See Curtis A. Bradley, Clear Statement Rules and Executive War Powers, 33 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 139 (2010); Jonathan F. Mitchell, Legislating Clear-Statement Regimes 
in National-Security Law, 43 GA. L. REV. 1059 (2009). 
 93 Rasul, 542 U.S. at 484. 
 94 Press Briefing, White House Press Sec’y Scott McClellan (June 21, 2005), avail-
able at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=66221#ixzz1OVyenpyK. 
For a collection of similar statements, see Stuart Taylor, Jr., Opening Argument—
Falsehoods About Guantánamo, NAT’L J. (Feb. 4, 2006), 
http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/opening-argument-falsehoods-about-
guantanamo-20060204?print=true.  
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access to the prison.  The only independent information the Ameri-
can public had about what was going on “inside the wire” or about 
who was being detained there came from released prisoners
95
 and, in 
one instance, from a military linguist who had assisted with interroga-
tions.
96
  Although Guantánamo had been functioning as a “War on 
Terror” prison since January 2002, prior to the Rasul decision the mil-
itary had not provided the public with any particularized justifications 
for the detention of any detainee.  Indeed, it was not until spring 
2006 that the public even learned the names of all of the men de-
tained at the prison.
97
 
By recognizing the detainees’ statutory right of habeas, however, 
the Supreme Court in Rasul forced the government to articulate—
initially to the habeas lawyers and eventually to the public itself—the 
alleged factual and legal justifications for the detentions.  In the fall 
of 2004, the government was forced to file factual returns justifying 
the detention of every prisoner who had filed a habeas petition in the 
federal courts.
98
  The effect was several-fold. 
First, the public learned for the first time that the government’s 
unsupported general allegations about the detainee population—that 
these were bomb makers and “facilitators of terror” who were picked 
up on the battlefield by U.S. troops
99
—was largely a fabrication.  The 
 
 95 See, e.g., MOAZZAM BEGG, ENEMY COMBATANT: MY IMPRISONMENT AT 
GUANTANAMO, BAGRAM, AND KANDAHAR (2006). 
 96 See ERIK SAAR & VIVECA NOVAK, INSIDE THE WIRE: A MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 
SOLDIER’S EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF LIFE AT GUANTÁNAMO (2005).  
 97 The Department of Defense released the names of the 558 detainees who had 
gone through the Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) process at Guantána-
mo on April 19, 2006.  See Kathleen T. Rhem, DoD Releases Names of 759 Current, For-
mer Guantanamo Detainees, AM. FORCES PRESS SERV. (May 1, 2006),  
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=15754.  Officials released the 
complete list of names (including the other 201 detainees who had been transferred 
or released before going through the CSRT process) about one month later.  See List 
of Individuals Detained by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba from January 
2002 Through May 15, 2006, MIAMI HERALD, http://media. 
miamiherald.com/smedia/2008/05/23/21/noor.source.prod_affiliate.56.pdf (last 
visited Sep. 26, 2011).   
 98 Although the government initially balked at filing factual returns, status hear-
ings called by Senior Judge Joyce Hens Green led counsel for the government to 
agree to provide justifications for the detentions beginning in September 2004.  See 
Coordination Order Setting Filing Schedule and Directing the Filing of Correspon-
dence Previously Submitted to the Court at 5–6, Abdah v. Bush, 04-CV-1254 (D.D.C. 
Sept. 20, 2004) (order of Judge Joyce Hens Green).  
 99 “The people that are there are people we picked up on the battlefield primari-
ly in Afghanistan.  They’re terrorists.  They’re bomb-makers.  They’re facilitators of 
terror.  They’re members of al Qaeda and the Taliban.”  Interview by Wolf Blitzer, 
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military’s own documents, turned over to the detainees’ lawyers as 
part of the factual returns, revealed that eighty-six percent of the 
prisoners had initially been taken into custody by Pakistani rather 
than American security forces, and that these captures had been 
made at the Afghanistan-Pakistan border rather than at anything re-
sembling an actual battlefield.
100
  The public also began to learn fan-
tastical details about the detentions of particular detainees: one pris-
oner was being held as an accomplice in a suicide bombing, even 
though the alleged suicide bomber was alive and well in Germany.
101
  
Another prisoner was held on suspicion of being a bodyguard for 
Usama bin Laden, based almost entirely on statements made by 




Second, because the lawyers were eventually given access to the 
habeas petitioners at Guantánamo, the public also soon learned 
about the circumstances of the prisoners’ detention, which indisput-
ably involved torture and mistreatment. Prisoners described to their 
lawyers “short-shackling,” sleep deprivation, subjection to uncomfort-
ably hot and cold temperatures, routine beatings, interrogations at 
gunpoint, and religious humiliation.
103
  In this regard, consider how 
much the public has learned about the detainees at Guantánamo 
 
CNN News Reporter, with Dick Cheney, Former Vice President, U.S. (June 23, 2005), 
available at http://edition.cnn.com/2005/US/06/24/cheney/index.html. 
 100 See DENBEAUX ET AL., supra note 86, at 2. 
 101 See Baher Azmy, Epilogue to MURAT KURNAZ, FIVE YEARS OF MY LIFE: AN INNOCENT 
MAN IN GUANTANAMO 240–46 (2008); Baher Azmy, Executive Detention, Boumediene, 
and the New Common Law of Habeas, 95 IOWA L. REV. 445, 447–48 (2010). 
 102 See Marc D. Falkoff, Litigation and Delay at Guantánamo Bay, 10 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 
393, 398–99 (2007) (discussing the case of Farouk Ali Ahmed); Corinne Hegland, 
Guantánamo’s Grip, NAT’L J. (Feb. 3, 2006), http://www3.nationaljournal.com 
/members/news/2006/02/0203nj1.htm (same).  Mr. Ahmed was released from 
Guantánamo in December 2009.  The Guantánamo Docket: Faruq Ali Ahmed, N.Y. TIMES, 
http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/detainees/32-faruq-ali-ahmed (last visited 
Sept. 26, 2011).  
 103 See CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, REPORT ON TORTURE, CRUEL, INHUMAN, 
AND DEGRADING TREATMENT OF PRISONERS AT GUANTÁNAMO BAY, CUBA 14–28 (2006), 
available at http://ccrjustice.org/files/Report_ReportOnTorture.pdf (cataloging al-
legation of mistreatment reported by Guantánamo prisoners’ lawyers).  In the sum-
mer of 2005, TIME posted to the Internet a classified document logging seven-weeks’ 
worth of interrogation sessions of prisoner Mohammed al-Qahtani, showing that he 
had been subjected to a host of humiliations (including invasion of his personal 
space by a female, water poured repeatedly over his head, photographs of 9/11 vic-
tims pinned to his clothes, and restricted access to a toilet) and life-threatening 
treatment (including interrogation for twenty hours a day for nearly the entire seven 
weeks, with a break allowed only for a brief period of hospitalization after his heart 
rate fell to thirty-five beats per minute).  INTERROGATION LOG OF DETAINEE 063 
92003), available at http://www.time.com/time/2006/log/log.pdf. 
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from their lawyers over the past seven years, including how they were 
captured and how they have been treated, in contrast with how little 
the public knows about the detainees at the U.S. prison in Bagram, 
Afghanistan, who likewise have sued for habeas relief but who, until 
now, have been unsuccessful in their attempts to force the military to 




Third, the public has also learned a great deal about the consti-
tutional philosophy of the Bush and Obama administrations from the 
Rasul litigation itself and the legal positions subsequently taken by the 
administrations.  The Bush administration, in defending the legal 
theory that the prisoners at Guantánamo were not entitled to habeas 
review in any court, was acting on a profoundly expansive under-
standing of the President‘s war powers and of the relative unimpor-
tance of Congress in detention policy.
105
  The Obama administration, 
notwithstanding the President’s executive order to close Guantánamo 
during his second day in office,
106
 has unexpectedly revealed a similar-
ly broad view of executive powers during wartime.  Indeed, the same 
arguments propounded by the Bush administration for denying the 
effectiveness of the writ at Guantánamo have been made by the Ob-
ama administration with respect to the reach of the writ at Bagram.
107
  
The government’s litigation position in these cases thus reveals an 
indirect benefit to the public of the habeas litigation, akin to the 
“tournament effect” by which an observer can glean information 
about participants who are engaged in competition by observing not 
only who wins the game, but also by observing how the players play the 
game, including what rules they are willing to bend or break to win.
108
  
The public has learned from the Guantánamo and Bagram litigation 
 
 104 See Falkoff & Knowles, supra note 46, at 853.  Along these lines, Amy Davidson 
has observed that “[i]f Guantánamo is, to quote the poetry of Donald Rumsfeld, a 
known known, Bagram is a known unknown.”  Amy Davidson, Close Read: What’s 
Going on at Bagram?, NEW YORKER (Sep. 14, 2009), 
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/closeread/2009/09/close-read-whats-
going-on-at-bagram.html.  
 105 See Memorandum from Patrick F. Philbin and John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant 
Att’ys Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to William J. Haynes, II, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep’t 
of Def., Possible Habeas Jurisdiction over Aliens Held in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (Dec. 28, 
2001), reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 29 (Karen J. 
Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005). 
 106 Review and Disposition of Individuals Detained at the Guantanamo Bay Naval 
Base and Closure of Detention Facilities, Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,897 
(Jan. 22, 2009). 
 107 See Falkoff & Knowles, supra note 46, at 866. 
 108 See Baker et al., supra note 30, at 56. 
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the extent of the Bush and Obama administrations’ expansive views 
of the powers of the executive vis-à-vis the other branches of govern-
ment. 
The Courts.  Another institutional actor that benefits from the 
habeas process is the judiciary itself.  Judges have an interest in pro-
moting information-forcing rules because, at the most basic level, it is 
their obligation to police the lawfulness of detentions.  They cannot 
perform this function if the executive does not provide legal or fac-
tual justification for the detentions.  Of course, to some degree this 
observation smacks of circularity: judges have an interest in forcing 
the executive to turn over information about a habeas petitioner’s 
detention because judges are tasked with enforcing habeas proce-
dures, which historically require the executive to turn over informa-
tion about the petitioner’s detention. 
There is, however, a normative point to be made here as well: by 
requiring the government to provide information about a detention 
on penalty of a court-ordered release of the petitioner, the judge will 
be able to make an informed decision about the appropriateness of 
the detention.  Particularly in the wartime executive-detention con-
text, the metes and bounds of the executive’s detention authority are 
not historically clear.  Where the rules for differentiating a constitu-
tional from an unconstitutional detention are fluid and unstable, the 
judge’s task in deciding on the legality of a detention is enhanced by 
default rules that promote the provision of more factual information.  
In short, judges’ decision-making is enhanced by more expansive 
access to factual information about detentions.
109
 
At a broader level, the information-forcing character of habeas 
enhances separation-of-powers values by limiting the power of the ex-
ecutive to act unilaterally, with no or only de minimis judicial over-
sight.
110
  Robust habeas procedures preserve the ability of the courts 
to check the political branches and, as such, are as much about pro-
tecting the role of the courts in our system of checks and balances as 
about protecting the “rights” of detainees.
111
 
The Executive.  A final institutional actor that benefits from the 
information-forcing function of habeas is, counter-intuitively, the ex-
ecutive itself.  It would seem that the President and the military have 
 
 109 Cf. Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps, supra note 13, at 91 (“[Penalty defaults] en-
courage the parties to reveal information to each other or to third parties (especially 
the courts).”). 
 110 See Stephen I. Vladeck, The Suspension Clause as a Structural Right, 62 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 275, 302–03 (2009). 
 111 See Vladeck, Quiet Theory, supra note 11, at 2011. 
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every incentive to prevent the release of information to the courts, 
the detainees, the detainees’ lawyers, and the public, since being 
forced to divulge information has the potential only to change the 
status quo in a manner that the executive does not desire—that is, to 
lead to the court-ordered release of a petitioner, or perhaps to politi-
cal pressure to release a petitioner that the executive wants to con-
tinue to detain.  Nonetheless, even the executive may benefit from 
robust information-forcing default rules in habeas. 
As the Guantánamo litigation has revealed, sometimes the ex-
ecutive branch does not itself know why it is detaining a particular 
prisoner.  In the Afghanistan conflict, most of the prisoners who 
ended up at Guantánamo were taken into custody not by U.S. sol-
diers, but by Pakistani security forces, who subsequently handed the 
detainees over to the Americans.
112
  The U.S. military chose not to 
hold status hearings about the enemy-combatant status of these de-
tainees, as is required under Army Regulation 190-8
113
 and Article 5 of 
the Geneva Conventions.
114
  Apparently applying Vice President Che-
ney’s “one-percent doctrine” to these captives,
115
 the Bush administra-
tion saw no downside to erring on the side of “caution” by detaining 
persons handed over to them, even if the evidence of involvement in 
terrorism or past combatancy was lacking. 
Partly as a result of the lack of information about the detainees, 
the Bush administration eventually released—without court order—
500 of the 775-odd prisoners held at Guantánamo.
116
  A robust habeas 
process would have required the executive to gather information for 
itself about these prisoners earlier.  Doing so would, of course, have 
spared perhaps hundreds of prisoners’ the deprivation of their liberty 
for literally years.  But it also would have redounded to the benefit of 
 
 112 See DENBEAUX ET AL., supra note 86, at 2 (reviewing government documents and 
finding that only five percent of detainees were captured by U.S. troops, and that 
eighty-six percent were picked up by Pakistani or Northern Alliances forces and 
handed over to U.S. custody). 
 113 U.S. Dep’t of the Army, Army Regulation 190-8, Enemy Prisoners of War, Re-
tained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees, available at 
http://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/pdf/R190_8.PDF.  
 114 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. 
 115 See RON SUSKIND, THE ONE-PERCENT DOCTRINE 62 (2006).  “If there’s a 1% 
chance that Pakistani scientists are helping al-Qaeda build or develop a nuclear wea-
pon, we have to treat it as a certainty in terms of our response.”  Id.  (describing Vice 
President Cheney’s approach to War on Terror issues). 
 116 See Scott Shane & Mark Landler, Obama, in Reversal, Clears Way for Guantanamo 
Trials to Resume, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2011, at A19 (“About 500 detainees were released 
by the Bush administration.”). 
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the executive in several ways.  First, investigative and translator re-
sources that were devoted to interrogating prisoners who were not in-
volved in terrorism or combatancy (or whose involvement was de mi-
nimis) could have been redeployed to useful endeavors rather than 
in a futile hunt for intelligence that the prisoners did not possess.  
Second, prisoners who in fact might have been involved in belligeren-
cy but who were released as political accommodations to allies (like 
the release of almost all Afghans who were detained at Guantánamo) 
would more likely have been detained further rather than released, 
and their acts of recidivism might not have taken place.
117
  Third, the 
legitimacy of the Bush administration’s Guantánamo project would 
have been enhanced if the public learned that, in fact, Guantánamo 
was only housing combatants and terrorists, rather than, as in fact, 
housing a small number of combatants and apparently large numbers 
of innocents and “small fry” foot-soldiers.
118
 
It is no mere hypothesis that the Bush administration did not 
know why most of the Guantánamo prisoners were there.  When the 
Obama administration took over, it was faced with a marked deficit of 
information about the facts underlying the detentions of the remain-
ing 240 Guantánamo prisoners.
119
  As a result, one of the new admin-
istration’s first acts was to form an executive task force to figure out 
 
 117 The Pentagon has occasionally made public its estimates of the amount of “re-
cidivism” among former Guantanamo prisoners.  See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF 
NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, SUMMARY OF THE REENGAGEMENT OF DETAINEES FORMERLY HELD 
AT GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA, (2010), available at  
http://www.dni.gov/electronic_reading_room/120710_Summary_of_the_Reengage
ment_of_Detainees_Formerly_Held_at_Guantanamo_Bay_Cuba.pdf (asserting that, 
as of October, 1, 2010, fully 150 of the 598 prisoners who had been released from 
Guantanamo were confirmed or suspected of “reengaging in terrorist or insurgent 
activities after transfer”).  Researchers for the New America Foundation, however, 
independently concluded that, as of January 2011, there was evidence that only forty-
nine of the 600 released Guantanamo prisoners either engaged with or are suspected 
to have engaged with insurgent groups after transfer.  See PETER BERGEN ET AL., NEW 




 118 “Of the 550 [detainees] that we have, I would say most of them, the majority of 
them, will either be released or transferred to their own countries. . . .Most of these 
guys weren’t fighting.  They were running.”  Mark Huband, US Officer Predicts Guan-
tánamo Releases, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2004, at 12, available at 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/192851d2-163b-11d9-b835-
00000e2511c8.html#axzz1VEcSGso7 (statement of Brigadier General Martin Lucen-
ti). 
 119 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT: GUANTÁNAMO REVIEW TASK FORCE ii 
(2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/guantanamo-review-final-report.pdf. 
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who these prisoners were and why they were in Guantánamo.
120
  The 
result of this review was a determination that 126 prisoners should be 
transferred, 30 additional Yemeni prisoners should be designated for 
“conditional” repatriation depending on the security conditions in 
Yemen, 44 prisoners should be referred for prosecution, and 48 pris-
oners should be detained because they were “dangerous,” even 
though there was insufficient evidence to prosecute them.
121
 
IV. WAR ON TERROR HABEAS ISSUES THROUGH THE LENS OF 
INFORMATION FORCING 
Our account of the information-forcing function of habeas cor-
pus provides some explanatory value for the handful of Supreme 
Court “War on Terror” opinions that have been issued since Rasul in 
2004.  But more importantly, it offers a useful paradigm for thinking 
about some of the many unresolved executive-detention habeas issues 
that remain pending before the lower federal courts and that may, or 
may not, be resolved ultimately by the Supreme Court.  Among those 
issues are what habeas procedures in the executive-detention context 
should look like (including, in particular, which party has the burden 
of proof and what the burden should be), and what remedy the fed-
eral court is authorized to provide to the successful habeas petitioner 
(immediate release or something else). 
In a handful of Guantánamo-related decisions since 2004, the 
Supreme Court has shown respect for the information-forcing func-
tion of habeas.  In Rasul, the Supreme Court overturned a D.C. Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals decision and held that the federal courts had 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to decide habeas petitions filed by 
Guantánamo prisoners.
122
  One way of understanding this decision is 
to recognize it as adopting a preference-eliciting or democracy-
forcing rule: in the face of an ambiguous statute, the Court will retain 
authority over habeas matters at least until Congress makes clear, to 
both the public and the courts, that it wants to strip habeas rights 
from non-citizens detained as enemy combatants and being held out-
side of the sovereign United States. 
Of course, if one of the purposes of the decision was really to 
elicit Congress’s preference with respect to such detentions, it 
seemed to have worked.  Congress proceeded to pass the Detainee 
 
 120 Id. at i. 
 121 Id. at ii. 
 122 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 473 (2004). 
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Treatment Act of 2005,
123
 which, to all appearances, stripped the fed-
eral courts of jurisdiction to hear the Guantánamo prisoners’ habeas 
cases.  Nonetheless, the Court held the next year in Hamdan v. Rums-
feld that Congress had not been sufficiently clear in stripping the 
courts of jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions that had already been 
filed in the federal courts.
124
  Again, the Court was demanding a clear 
statement of Congress’s intent to take the extraordinary step of strip-
ping a federal court of its habeas jurisdiction.  While at some level the 
Hamdan decision was clearly protecting the judiciary’s turf and polic-
ing against a potential separation-of-powers violation, it was also de-
manding that Congress express its preferences clearly and stand 
ready to be held politically accountable for its decisions.
125
 
The Hamdan decision led Congress to act yet again, and this 
time it made its preferences perfectly clear in the Military Commis-
sions Act of 2006 (MCA).
126
  Having successfully elicited Congress’s 
preferences and forced a clear statement of its intent to strip the fed-
eral courts of habeas jurisdiction of the Guantánamo detainee cases, 
the Court was compelled to address the substance of the constitu-
tional habeas right asserted by the detainees.
127
  Because it was clear 
after the passage of the MCA that there was no longer any statutory 
authorization for the federal courts to exercise habeas jurisdiction, 
the Court was forced to decide in Boumediene v. Bush in 2008 whether 
the protections of the Suspension Clause extended to non-citizens 
detained as “enemy combatants” outside of the sovereign United 
States territory.
128
  Equally important, if the Guantánamo prisoners in 
particular were entitled to some kind of due process protections via 
habeas, were the procedures that had been used by the military to de-
termine “enemy combatant” status an adequate and effective substi-
tute for habeas procedures in the courts? 
The answers given by Justice Kennedy in Boumediene are consis-
tent with an information-forcing approach to habeas.  First, Justice 
Kennedy recognized that the Guantánamo prisoners had a constitu-
 
 123 Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2742 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 10, 28, and 42 U.S.C. (2006)). 
 124 548 U.S. 557 (2006).  
 125 John Ferejohn and Barry Friedman note a similar “deliberation forcing” ap-
proach in the concurring opinions of Justices Souter and Scalia in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 
542 U.S. 507 (2004).  See Ferejohn & Friedman, supra note 37, at 847–48.  
 126 Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, 
and 42 U.S.C).  
 127 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 738–39 (2008) (acknowledging litiga-
tion history that prompted congress to pass MCA). 
 128 Id. at 739. 
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tional right to habeas that was operative apart from any congressional 
authorization.
129
  Had the Court held otherwise, the executive would 
have been under no obligation to release any information about its 
reasons for detaining individual prisoners.  The Court’s recognition 
of a constitutional right of the Guantánamo prisoners to habeas hear-
ings (or, more accurately, a constitutional requirement that the gov-
ernment justify its detention decisions to the courts),
130
 both pro-
tected separation of powers principles and necessarily had an 
information-forcing effect.  Second, by dismissing the government’s 
argument that its “enemy combatant” review procedures were an 
adequate and effective substitute for habeas review in the courts, Jus-
tice Kennedy’s decision had the substantive effect of requiring the 
military to provide more information in a more public forum than it 
had to that point in time made available in its non-public Combatant 
Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs)—which detainees’ counsel were not 
allowed to attend.
131
  Third, the presumptive penalty default for the 
government’s failure to provide the court with adequate factual justi-




While the Supreme Court’s decisions have been consistent with 
the information-forcing role of habeas, the course of litigation in the 
lower federal courts in the federal district for the District of Colum-
 
 129 Id. at 771. 
 130 See Robert Knowles & Marc D. Falkoff, Toward a Limited Government Theory of 
Extraterritorial Detention, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 637, 641 (2007) (suggesting that 
the proper inquiry should focus on powers granted to the government by the Consti-
tution, rather than on “rights” possessed by prisoners); Falkoff & Knowles,  supra 
note 46, at 851 (same).   
 131 See Memorandum from Gordon England, Sec’y of the Navy, at Enclosure (1), § 
F(5) (Jul. 29, 
2004), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/Jul2004/d20040730comb.pdf 
(“The detainee shall not be represented by legal counsel . . . .”).  The implementa-
tion procedures for the CSRTs did not proscribe press observers from attending the 
hearings, but no notice to the public was given in advance of the hearings, and re-
porters were allowed to attend only if they were otherwise on the naval base and had 
made a special request.  See Transcript of Annual Administrative Review Boards for Ene-
my Combatants Held at Guantanamo, U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, March 6, 2007, available at 
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3902 (statement of 
Senior Defense Official). The result was that 521 of the 558 tribunals held in 2004 
and 2005 were observed by no members of the press or public.  Id.  
 132 See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 779 (citing Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. 75, 117 (1807), 
for proposition that where the detention is unlawful, the court “can only direct [the 
prisoner] to be discharged”)(“[T]he habeas court must have the power to order the 
conditional release of an individual unlawfully detained—though release need not 
be the exclusive remedy and is not the appropriate one in every case in which the 
writ is granted.”). 
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bia, where all of the Guantánamo cases have been heard, has been 
spottier.  To be sure, at the district court level the judges have worked 
to put into effect the mandate of Boumediene, devising procedures, 
with minimal guidance from the Supreme Court, that are consistent 
with due process and the information-forcing purposes of habeas.  
The district court consolidated for case management purposes all of 
the Guantánamo habeas petitions pending in the district, so that all 
of the judges were following the same set of procedures.  These 
common procedures included a requirement that the government 
file “returns” or answers to the detainees’ habeas petitions, a re-
quirement that the government search for and provide exculpatory 
evidence to the petitioners, and provisions for limited discovery and 
evidentiary hearings—all of which were designed to flush more in-
formation from the military than it was willing to release voluntarily 
in the CSRTs.
133
  In addition, the judge before whom case manage-
ment issues were consolidated concluded that the government had 
the burden of justifying the legality of the detention, and that it had 
to prove the prisoner was a detainable “enemy combatant” by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence (rather than by merely “some evidence,” 
as the military had initially argued).
134
  One result of this “heigh-
tened” standard was to force the government to provide the public 
with more information about the detention than would have been 
required under a lower standard.
135
  Finally, as we discuss briefly be-
low, the Case Management Order requires the government to file 
unclassified versions of each factual return within fourteen days of 
the filing of the classified version with the court (or within fourteen 
days of the November 6, 2008, issuance of the Case Management Or-
der for returns that had already been filed).
136
 
From an information-forcing point of view, the promulgation 
and deployment of these procedures at the district court level has 
been generally effective.  Of course, more than thirty prisoners have 
had their detentions declared illegal since these procedures went into 
 
 133 Case Management Order, In re Guantánamo Bay Detainee Litig. at 2–3, 6, No. 
08-0442, (D.D.C. Nov. 6, 2008) [hereinafter Guantánamo CMO], available at 
http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/district-of-
columbia/dcdce/1:2008mc00442/131990/940. 
 134 Id. at 4–5. 
 135 Recently a panel of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit stated, in dicta, 
that the preponderance standard might be too high for these habeas cases.  See Al-
Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1104–05 (D.C. Cir. 2010).  “Although we doubt, for 
the reasons stated above, that the Suspension Clause requires the use of the prepon-
derance standard, we will not decide the question in this case.” Id. at 1005. 
 136 Guantánamo CMO, supra note 133, at 2. 
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effect in the wake of Boumediene,
137
 which is the primary consideration 
for the prisoners themselves. But from a structural point of view, oth-
er effects have been equally interesting.  Most importantly, the public 
has learned a great deal about the quality and quantity of evidence 
that the military possesses about the prior criminal, terrorist, and 
combatancy history of many of the individual detainees.  In many 
cases, the evidence has been adequate to convince district court 
judges (and, subsequently, appellate court judges) that the detainee 
was more likely than not an enemy combatant who was properly de-
tainable under the Authorization for the Use of Military Force.
138
  
That alone adds legitimacy to the detention decisions of the military, 
which had heretofore been reduced to justifying its detention deci-
sions to the public merely on its own assertions.  In more than thirty 
cases, however, the public has likewise learned that the government 
had detained individuals at Guantánamo for up to nine years on the 
basis of scant evidence indeed—and often this evidence was incon-
testably procured as the result of torture or abusive conduct.
139
  In 
fact, the release of several prisoners on the eve of their habeas hear-
ings may well have been motivated by the military’s desire not to re-
veal how poor its cases against the detainees were.
140
 
Other aspects of the district courts’ handling of the Guantánamo 
habeas hearings have, however, seemed contrary to the information-
forcing spirit of the Boumediene decision.  Most importantly, the dis-
 
 137 See, e.g., Warren Richey, In Antiterror Fight, Obama Hears Much the Same Criticisms 
as Bush, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Oct. 18, 2009, at 6 (“Of 38 Guantánamo habeas 
corpus cases in which judges had examined the government’s evidence, 30 detainees 
had been ordered released.”).   
 138 As of September 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit had af-
firmed seven district court denials of the writ to Guantánamo petitioners.  See, e.g., Al-
Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 868–69 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 139 See, e.g., Hatim v. Obama, 677 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2009) (granting writ to 
Guantánamo prisoner and noting that, “[s]ignificantly, the government does not 
contest the petitioner’s claims of torture”), vacated and remanded on other grounds, Ha-
tim v. Gates, 632 F.3d 720 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 140 The circumstances of Faruq Ali Ahmed’s release are a case in point.  On Octo-
ber 8, 2009—more than seven and a half years after Ahmed’s arrival at Guantana-
mo—the district court judge for his case scheduled a habeas merits hearing for No-
vember 2, 2009.  See Prehearing Order, Abdah v. Obama, 04-CV-1254 (D.D.C. Oct. 8, 
2009).  The merits hearing never occurred, though Ahmed had been seeking one 
since he filed a habeas petition in July 2004.  No information has been made public 
about why no hearing was held, but the court’s docket reveals literally dozens of 
“sealed” notices of filings, status reports and orders from October through December 
2009.  Ahmed was released from Guantanamo and transferred to his home in Yemen 
on December 19, 2009.  See The Guantanamo Docket: Faruq Ali Ahmed, N.Y. TIMES,  
http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/detainees/32-faruq-ali-ahmed (last visited 
Oct. 20, 2011)(noting the date of Ahmed’s transfer). 
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trict court judges have generally been unwilling to demand that the 
government fulfill its obligations to litigate the cases in a public man-
ner and to reveal to the public information that is neither classified 
nor for which release would represent a national security threat.  A 
look at the dockets of the Guantánamo habeas cases will show entry 
after entry of filings from the government under seal, as well as a dis-
turbing number of entries that reveal ex parte filings to which not even 
the detainees’ lawyers—all of whom have at least secret-level security 
clearances—are privy.
141
  While there is no doubt that the district 
court has an obligation to respect government assertions that classi-
fied information has to be protected, the shroud of darkness that has 
been drawn over these cases is worthy of remark. 
In addition, even at this late date, the government has not yet 
complied with the Case Management Order requirement that it files 
unclassified versions of the factual returns within fourteen days of fil-
ing classified versions of the returns. This requirement is consistent 
not only with our national tradition of open court proceedings, but 
also with the information-forcing and thus democracy-enhancing role 
of the writ.  So long as the government is withholding from the public 
the (unclassified, at least) facts supporting its detention decisions, 
there was no way for the public even to begin to judge the legitimacy 
and competency of the executive’s conduct in the “War on Terror.” 
The government complied with the Case Management Order in 
December 2008 but did so by filing “unclassified” versions of the fac-
tual returns that it simultaneously designated in their entirety as “pro-
tected information”—meaning that the documents could not be 
viewed by the public or filed on the public docket because, in theory, 
they contained sensitive (albeit unclassified) information.
142
  The pro-
cedures for designating information as “protected” under the protec-
tive order in place in the Guantánamo cases did not, however, au-
thorize that kind of wholesale shielding of information from the 
public; the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals had twice before disallowed 
similar government behavior.
143
  In the spring of 2009, the govern-
 
 141 For example, the docket sheet in Abdah v. Bush reveals that the government 
has made at least eight ex parte filings since January 2009.  See Docket Sheet, Abdah v. 
Bush, 04-CV-1254, 411, 429, 461, 604, 674, 680, 889, 905 (D.D.C. Sept. 20, 2004).  
 142 Id. at 1244, 1379. 
 143 See Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 836–37 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (rejecting govern-
ment’s “generic” explanations for why certain information should be designated 
“protected” and subject to sealing); Bismullah v. Gates, 501 F.3d 178, 188 (D.C. Cir. 
2007) (rejecting government attempts to make unilateral determinations about 
whether information should be designated as “protected” and therefore subject to 
sealing).  
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ment sought district court confirmation of the “protected” status of 
the returns, something to which the Guantánamo prisoners and press 
intervenors objected.  The district court judge denied the govern-
ment’s motion in the summer of 2009 and ordered unclassified fac-
tual returns to be filed on the public record.
144
  The government 
again complied with the letter of the order but did so by filing ver-
sions of the factual returns that simply redacted the non-classified in-
formation that it had earlier sought to be treated as protected.  Again 
the district court heard arguments, and in January 2010 held that the 
government had failed to follow the court’s summer 2009 order.
145
 
As of October 2010, the government had still not complied with 
the order, another hearing about the status of the unclassified ver-
sions of the returns was held, and in May 2011 the district court is-
sued yet another memorandum opinion and order, discussing again 
the procedures for the government to seek “protected” status for des-
ignated information in the returns.
146
  The saga continues, and to 
date, the Government still has not yet made the full versions of the 
factual returns available to the public.  Although the district court 
judge responsible for overseeing compliance with these orders de-
nied the press intervenors’ request that the government be sanc-
tioned for its conduct in this matter, it is plain that the government’s 
litigation tactics have successfully stalled public availability of the fac-
tual returns for the prisoners for literally years.  One interesting ef-
fect of this delay is that the detainees’ lawyers find themselves stymied 
by the rules of the protective order and are unable to use government 
concessions from the factual returns in the defense of their clients in 
the court of public opinion—even as classified documents concern-
ing the prisoners have been posted on the Internet by Wikileaks.
147
  At 
any rate, we believe that part of the reason the district court has tole-
rated these government shifts is that—on the invitation of the press 
intervenors—it has viewed the provision of factual returns to the pub-
lic as founded in a First Amendment right to view all civil hearings, 
 
 144 In re Guantánamo Bay Detainee Litig., 630 F. Supp. 2d 1, 13 (D.D.C. 
2009)(mem.). 
 145 Order Denying Press Intervenors’ Motion for Order to Show Cause at 1–2, In re 
Guantánamo Bay Detainee Litig., No. 08-0442 (D.D.C. Jan. 14, 2010) (“[The] Court 
finds that the Government has failed to comply with the Court’s June 1, 2009 or-
der.”). 
 146 In re Guantánamo Bay Detainee Litig., No. 08-0442, 40–42 (D.D.C. May 31, 
2011) (mem.). 
 147 See Charlie Savage et al., Details of Lives in an American Limbo, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
24, 2011, at A1.  
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including habeas hearings.
148
  The court might be less willing to 
brook the government’s delay, however, if it considered the unique, 
information-forcing role of the habeas process,
149
 which, after all, was 
designed to guard against the worry, articulated by Blackstone, that 
“confinement of the person, by secretly hurrying him off to jail, 
where his sufferings are unknown or forgotten, is a less public, less 




Perhaps most distressing, however, has been the response to the 
Guantánamo habeas cases from the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, 
which has been undermining the information-forcing foundation of 
the Supreme Court’s “War on Terror” decisions.  In particular, the 
D.C. Circuit has issued several opinions that cut against the informa-
tion-forcing role of habeas.  Most importantly, in Kiyemba v. Obama, 
the D.C. Circuit reversed a district court order to the government to 
either find a suitable country for the release of several Uighur habeas 
winners or else release them into the United States.
151
  The D.C. Cir-
cuit, which stated that the federal courts do not have the power to 
order the executive to bring non-citizens into the country,
152
 effective-
ly removed the default penalty—an order of release from the district 
court if the government does not provide information justifying a de-
tention—from the habeas equation.  After the D.C. Circuit’s decision 
in Kiyemba, there is nothing that will compel the government to pro-
vide information to the detainee (or to the public, for that matter) to 
justify the detention. 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, we have offered a conceptual model for under-
standing an important structural role that the writ of habeas corpus 
plays in our constitutional system.  We believe that a properly func-
 
 148 In re Guantánamo Bay Detainee Litig., 630 F. Supp. 2d at 12–13. 
 149 The district court did, however, note: “Public interest in Guantánamo Bay gen-
erally and these proceedings specifically has been unwavering.  The public’s under-
standing of the proceedings, however, is incomplete without the factual returns.”  Id. 
at 11. 
 150 BLACKSTONE, supra note 71, at 185. 
 151 555 F.3d 1022, 1029 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“And so we ask again: what law autho-
rized the district court to order the government to bring petitioners to the United 
States and release them here?  It cannot be that because the court had habeas juris-
diction it could fashion the sort of remedy petitioners desired.”) (citation omitted), 
vacated, Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S. Ct. 1235 (2010), reinstated and modified on remand, 
Kiyemba v. Obama, 605 F.3d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 152 Id.  
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tioning process for seeking habeas relief serves all parties and all in-
stitutional actors well, and that under the pressure of national securi-
ty concerns, courts have not always satisfactorily addressed the chal-
lenges presented by cases arising from the “War on Terror.”  
Although we advocate a robust judicial enforcement of the obligation 
of the return, we nowhere argue for a radical transparency, and we 
accept that some information is properly classified and protected by 
the executive branch. We believe, however, that those instances 
should be the exceptions, not the norm. 
We make this argument, in part, because we have seen the very 
real effects of a simple requirement that the government justify its 
position to an independent judge, rather than being allowed to ob-
scure its evidence and reasoning through the assertion of national se-
curity.  In the early days of the Guantánamo habeas litigation, the Jus-
tice Department responded to a set of habeas petitions that had been 
assigned to Judge Richard Leon not with a return, but with a motion 
to dismiss.  The government argued that because the executive’s de-
cision to detain the seven petitioners at issue was unrevealed, and be-
cause these men had no rights under the U.S. Constitution that they 
could vindicate, the court should summarily dismiss the pending peti-
tions.  After full briefing and oral argument, Judge Leon agreed with 
the government and summarily dismissed the petitions.
153
  One of 
those petitions was filed on behalf of a man named Lakhdar Boume-
diene.
154
  His petition, and that of the other petitioners, eventually 
made its way to the Supreme Court, which, of course, rejected the 
government’s position.
155
  Remarkably, after further proceedings, in-
cluding the government’s filing of a return for each of the petitions, 
the very same Judge Leon granted all but one of the petitions and 
ordered the men released.
156
  The distinguishing factor between the 
Judge Leon of 2005 and the Judge Leon of 2008 is that he was able to 
see the government’s asserted basis for detention and conclude that 
it was inadequate. 
Each of the five men who were eventually ordered released by 
Judge Leon because of the inadequacy of the government’s asserted 
justification (a justification offered after six years of detention and 
with classified evidence permitted) would have been stopped cold in 
 
 153 See Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311, 323 (D.D.C. 2005) (“[P]etitioners lack 
any viable theory under the United States Constitution to challenge the lawfulness of 
their continued detention at Guantánamo.”). 
 154 Id. at 316. 
 155 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 726 (2008). 
 156 Boumediene v. Bush, 579 F. Supp. 2d 191, 197–98 (D.D.C. 2008). 
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their efforts to contest their detention under the government’s origi-
nal position.  Not only would the detainees not have prevailed, but 
they would not have been permitted to even hear an accounting from 
the government as to why it was depriving them of their liberty. 
 
